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Abstract 
The study of financial market volatility has focused on the unexpected and expected components 
of news (Vortelinos, 2015; Omrane and Hafner, 2015). We incorporate the role of biases arising 
from the 'availability' of recent outcomes to the traders, in influencing trading decisions. The theory 
of heuristics (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) is used to build on the theory of trader's biases which 
helps to understand the reasons behind market volatility. Empirically the model is tested with five 
minute data on USD/INR and time stamped news from the US and Indian markets. We find that 
volatility is likely to be in higher ranges with increase in trader's biases, corresponding to 
unexpected news component. GARCH analysis of returns of average bid-ask rates shows that 
unexpected news, expected news and bias corresponding to expected news lead to increased 
volatility.  
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Section 1: Introduction 
The association of exchange rate volatility to macroeconomic news announcements is supported 
by strong empirical evidence (Vortelinos, 2015; Omrane and Hafner, 2015, Bessembinder, 1994). 
Economic literature shows that macroeconomic announcements and news events have a positive 
impact on the market volatility (Bessembinder, 1994; Fleming and Remolona, 1999; Evans and 
Lyons, 2005, 2008; Omrane & Hafner, 2015). However, while both asymmetric information and 
the rise in inventory costs can explain the exchange rate volatility (Fleming and Remolona, 1999, 
Chari, 2007), role of trader's perceptions formed by past market movement has remained largely 
unexplored. We add to the understanding of market volatility by incorporating the role of heuristics 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) in explaining trader's behaviour. Following Tversky and 
Kahneman (Ibid) work on heuristics, we introduce the concept of "Bias" to explain the behaviour 
of participants in the financial markets. Bias reflects perceptions arising from the 'availability' of 
recent outcomes, and looks at the influence of previous exchange rate movement in response to 
news, in determining trading decision making. The unexpected and expected components of a 
news event, and the market movement in response of it create likely scenarios ("available" to the 
trader instantaneously based on recent past experience) in the minds of the traders, which in turn 
dominate the decisions made in the current period. We find that, instead of the new set of factors 
that can influence exchange rate movement, the experience of the prior movement has a 
determining influence on market volatility.  
Empirically the theory is tested with reference to the Indian foreign exchange market which have 
seen sharp volatility is recent past. We examine the impact of three factors, macroeconomic news, 
trader's biases and technical analysis indicators1, on volatility of movement for the Indian rupee 
for a period of three months, 24th May, 2017 to 24th August, 2018. Time stamped exchange rate 
data is taken at the high frequency level of five minutes to understand market heterogeneity better. 
The time stamped macroeconomic news announcements from India and the United States markets 
                                                          
1 At any particular moment in the market, there would be traders trading on fundamentals as well as 
chartists, trading on the basis of chart movements. We incorporate chartist's perceptions through the 
difference between price and 10 period average prices, a technical analysis indicator.  
 
 
  
is availed collated from the Thomson Reuters Eikon database and cover news related to inflation, 
growth, industry, government and central banks.  
We find that news events and trader's biases have a statistically significant positive impact on 
market volatility. The expected component of news and trader's biases evolving from their past 
experiences lead to an increase in market heterogeneity while unexpected news shock leads to a 
slight fall in volatility.  
The role of both asymmetric information and the rise in inventory costs have been discussed with 
regard to exchange rate volatility (Fleming and Remolona, 1999, Chari, 2007). However, the 
reaction of traders to the macroeconomic news is better understood in the context of psychology 
of human decision making under uncertainty. While participants have information on the likely 
factors influencing exchange rate behaviour, the news announcements majorly do not lead to a 
clear view emerging on the exchange rate movement as macroeconomic fundamentals are 
interpreted by different people in different ways. The previous exchange rate movement in this 
case forms a guide to traders for the exchange rate behaviour in the immediate future, who form 
trading decisions accordingly.  
The paper contributes to the economic literature in two major ways. First, the theoretical 
framework adds on to the understanding of market volatility, by incorporating the influence of 
trader's bias, (arising out of perceptions created by past market movements) on market 
heterogeneity. Secondly, the volatility of USD/INR pair is analyzed with the use of high frequency 
data and time stamped news. While the Indian rupee has experienced volatile market conditions in 
the recent past, to the best of our knowledge, such a study has not been attempted to understand 
the reasons behind the market volatility.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical background and 
Section 3 gives the methodology and data. Section 4 presents and discusses the results.  
Section 2: Theoretical background 
The advent of new information in financial markets is a catalyst for action. The impact of such 
information in the form of macroeconomic news on market volatility is an essential feature of the 
financial market analysis. There is strong empirical evidence of the link between macroeconomic 
news and volatility in financial markets, including foreign exchange markets (Bessembinder, 1994; 
Fleming and Remolona, 1999; Hartmann, 1999; Galati, 2000; Evans and Lyons, 2005, 2008; 
Omrane & Hafner, 2015 and Vortelinos, 2015). As foreign exchange markets may take a 
  
considerable period to absorb news (Evans and Lyons, 2005), the impact of a news will include 
the 'instantaneous' change in the exchange rate, and the induced changes over time (Evans and 
Lyons, 2008).  
What happens in financial markets following the arrival of macroeconomic news? Fleming and 
Remolona (1999) show that macroeconomic announcements have the greatest impact on bid-ask 
spreads in the shortest time frames and the sharp change in bid-ask spread following a 
macroeconomic announcement is irrespective of trading. A macroeconomic news essentially leads 
to a revision of expectations regarding the price movement among market participants. News is a 
medium for participants in financial markets to make sense of economic fundamentals. With the 
arrival of news therefore, an opportunity presents itself before the trader to initiate or revise his 
trades. The reaction of the market participants to the changed macroeconomic fundamentals is thus 
reflected through the quote given for trading. 
In microstructure theory, bid ask spreads represent order processing costs, asymmetric information 
costs and inventory carrying costs (Bessembinder, 1994). The act of market making imposes on 
interbank dealers the need to either maintain liquidity in terms of currencies themselves or provide 
liquidity to counterparties by trading at given rates immediately. This "provision of immediacy" 
leads to opportunity costs of holding liquid inventory (Bessembinder, Ibid). The inventory carrying 
costs, in this model, explain to a large extent the variation in exchange rate with news.  
Asymmetric information reflect the widening of spreads as participants face more 'informed' 
traders. In the presence of a more informed trader with insider information will lead to a rise in 
bid-ask spreads by existing participants to protect against the lack of information (Fleming and 
Remolona, 1998). Galati (2000) points out that the presence of inventory carrying cost and 
information asymmetry is more important than the order processing costs in explain the widening 
of bid ask spreads, as typically order processing costs are small in foreign exchange markets.  
Fleming and Remolona (1999) mark the two stages of adjustment to macroeconomic news– the 
release of new information leads to widening of spreads as the market makers look at inventory 
costs. This change is sharp and instantaneous and leads to fall in trading volume as market makers 
withdraw from trading. In stage two, trading increases with volatility remaining high as there is 
"residual disagreement among investors about what the just released information means for prices" 
(Fleming and Remolona, 1999).  
  
The above point is corroborated studies on market volatility. For example, market participants may 
have an imprecise estimate of fundamentals with precise estimate of exchange rate targets (Evans 
and Lyons 2002). Dreger and Stadtmann (Ibid) points out that exchange rate expectation differs 
across market participants. Heterogeneity comes from the use of different models or different 
provisions in the same model and different interpretations of fundamental and technical indicators 
(Dreger & Stadtmann 2008; Chari 2007).  
Why do traders not form uniform view-points on the market movement to be expected? While 
fundamental factors should make every market participant should have a similar view of exchange 
rate movement, it does not happen so. We incorporate the concept of biases inherent in our 
judgments (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974), to the financial markets for a better understanding of 
the process of increased volatility. Tversky and Kahneman, Ibid, talk of the availability bias where 
people assess the "probability of an event by the ease with which instances or occurrences can be 
brought to mind" (pp.1127). This also means that recent occurrences is likely to be "relatively 
more available than earlier occurrences"(pp.1127).   
How does this apply to financial markets? Every time as a new set of information and news comes, 
the trader is to objectively analyse the old and new trades with reference to the new information. 
However since traders are exposed to market happenings every day they will carry "availability" 
of likely scenarios of exchange rate movement in their minds, depending on the unexpected and 
expected components of news. In the decision-making process therefore, these likely scenarios (" 
available" to the trader instantaneously), dominate the decision made in the current period. The 
trader thinks she's completely objective in analyzing a new set of information but it is far from so. 
In an interesting take, Tversky and Kahneman, Ibid, point out that "subjective probability of traffic 
accidents rises temporarily when one sees a car overturned by the side of the road"(pp.1127).  All 
these point out to the role of available past scenarios in guiding decision-making even with a new 
set of information available. The forecasting of market movement now comes from the possible 
set of past experiences or available solutions to the trader.  
Further, while expert's intuitions are effects of prolonged practices, professional intuitions do not 
all arise from the experience. "When confronted with the problem of choosing a chess move or 
deciding whether to invest in a stock, the machinery of intuitive thought does the best it can 
(Kahnemann,2011 . p.12)." If the problem at hand is very complex and no skill solutions available, 
thus the answer that comes to mind will be the easier one and may not be the right one. Intuitive 
  
heuristics in a different situation involves a answering an easier question without noticing 
substitution (Kahnemann, 2011). The solutions available to the trader therefore dominate the 
decision making in this case. If there are inherent bias in reaction of participant's to market events, 
the widening of spread may not be determined simply by information asymmetry and costs. It is 
thus possible to use the theory of heuristics to better explain the decision-making of traders under 
uncertainty.  
The analysis of volatility in foreign exchange markets incorporates an understanding of what 
happens in a particular trading scenario. At any point of time in the market, we can conceive of 
the participants being composed of traders who trade on the basis of fundamentals and traders who 
are 'chartists' or trade on the basis of technicals. It is plausible to think of most traders using a 
combination of both, so that each trading decision considers the 'fundamental' factors as well as 
the signals generated from technical analysis. Technical analysis strategies are commonly used by 
traders for trading decision making (Menkoff & Taylor, 2007). The popularity of technical analysis 
comes from the fact that traders concur on the profitability of technical analysis strategies, in spite 
of the deep academic distrust of it and a host of empirical studies have shown that technical 
analysis is indeed profitable and generates excess returns, eschewing the academic negation of it 
(Pinches, 1970, Menkoff & Taylor, Ibid, Saacke, 2002).  
As traders evaluate the new information set, and take the trading decision, they are unknowingly 
influenced by the past set of solutions ( or market movements experienced) available to them. Thus 
the trades are influenced not only by news and by the element of surprise in the news, but also by 
the biases inherent in the trading decision, which comes from the influence of past market action 
on traders. These biases we refer to as perceptions in our model of spot market volatility.  
To understand the impact of news and perceptions (biases) on volatility of exchange rate, we 
conceive of a trading scenario where the market participants use both fundamental and technical 
analysis to take trading positions, in addition to intervention news. The first order condition for 
optimal choice of the present period spot rate following Chari (2007) is given as: 
𝑃0 = 𝑏1 + 𝑏2𝜀?̌? + 𝑏3𝜀?̌?+𝑏4𝜀?̌?……………………………………………………….….(1) 
Where 𝜀?̌? ≅ 𝑁(0, 𝜏𝑝) is the trader's prior about the fundamentals or news, 𝜀?̌? ≅ 𝑁(0, 𝜏𝑡)is the 
trader's prior about the technicals and 𝜀?̌? ≅ 𝑁(0, 𝜏𝐼) is the trader's perceptions resulting from the 
interaction of past exchange rate movements with expected and unexpected news component. 
  
𝜏𝑝 ,  𝜏𝑡 ,    𝜏𝐼 are measures of precision, with variance being the inverse of precision. With the 
incorporation of the these factors, the variance of spot rate can be written as 
𝜎𝑃0
2 = 𝑏2
2𝜎?̌?𝑝
2 + 𝑏3
2𝜎?̌?𝑡
2 + 𝑏4
2𝜎?̌?𝐼
2 + 2𝑏2𝑏3𝜎?̌?𝑝𝑡
2 + 2𝑏2𝑏4𝜎?̌?𝑝𝐼
2 + 2𝑏3𝑏4𝜎?̌?𝑡𝐼
2 ………………(2), 
In the second equation, the variance terms depends on speculator's prior precision on fundamentals, 
technical indicators or the perceptions or biases manifested in the trading decisions.  
Using the above model, we can conceive of the stages of the reaction of market participants to a 
random news shock. Following Chari (2007) we develop a timeline to understand this adjustment 
process.   
T= -1: Market participants have specific views on the exchange rate depending on the available 
information on the fundamentals and/or signals from technical indicators, most commonly trend 
following ones.  In the period preceding the arrival of news, market participants have updated their 
perceptions depending on the previous movement in the market. 
1. At T= 0: News arrives in the market, which has an unexpected and an expected component. 
The markets react to the unexpected and expected components with an update of the prior and 
a change in trading positions if required. However, more than the present information set 
available to the market participant, the previous market move in response to the unexpected 
and expected components of news guide the trader in decision making. The trader's decision 
making is influenced and biased by the past set of solutions available of them, and this 
influences the present market move. 
2. At T= 1: Volatility is likely to increase as market participants react to the intervention by 
widening bid-ask spreads. However, how much volatility will increase will depend on how 
much the market had moved previously to the unexpected component of the news, as this 
influences the trading decisions today. 
3. 𝑇 → ∞ The greater the prior reaction of market to the news, the more the participants are likely 
to react in the present scenario expecting the past movement to be a guide for the present. This 
process get repeated with every news shock in the market.  
In this paper, we incorporate both the news as well as the trading bias to understand better how 
volatility develops in the market. The formal model therefore looks at the unexpected and expected 
components of news as well as an interaction of exchange rate movement in the recent past with 
  
the unexpected and expected components of news, representing the way past solutions will bias 
the trader in the present decision-making. 
Section 3: Data and methodology 
To understand the impact of intervention on volatility as reflected in the bid-ask spreads, we look 
at the difference between average bid-ask spread (DELAVG) between consecutive periods. The 
exchange rate data is taken at a high frequency level of five minutes. The change in average bid-
ask spread serves as a proxy for volatility as bid–ask spread in the current period reflects dealers’ 
expectations of current volatility (Chari 2007). As the news data is available with a gap of thirty 
minutes, we map the exchange rate data to the news data, by taking the average of bid and ask rate 
over a thirty minute period.  
The use of bid-ask spread as a proxy for volatility is based on economic literature supporting a 
positive association between spread and volatility (Bollerslev and Melvin, 1994; Hartmann, 1999; 
Galati, 2000; Bjønnes and Rime, 2003 and Osler et al. 2011).The seminal work of Bollerslev & 
Melvin (1994) emphasize the link between bid-ask spreads and volatility. Bollerslev & Melvin 
(Ibid) point out why, in response to greater uncertainty regarding the future spot rate, there is a 
widening of the bid-ask spread, instead of both the bid and the ask moving in the same direction. 
The theoretical model developed in this paper with liquidity and information-based trades, as also 
the empirical analysis, show that the spread, in equilibrium, is positively related to the standard 
deviation of exchange rate. Bollerslev & Melvin (Ibid) further contend that while in a more general 
model with 'endogenous information acquisition', the proportionality between spread and standard 
deviation may fail to hold, the results (of the positive association between volatility and spread) 
remain generally valid (p.359). Galati (2000) finds evidence supporting the positive relationship 
between spread and volatility for emerging market nations, including India, linking it to the rise in 
inventory costs.  
Why should the dealers widen the bid-ask spread as a response to market uncertainty? To 
understand this, we need to consider the information access to market participants. Given that 
select market participants will have access to private information, dealers try to guard themselves 
against this information asymmetry by raising the spreads, so that spreads are inversely related to 
information content (Bjønnes and Rime 2003, Osler et al. 2011). Bid-ask spreads reflect reaction 
of dealers to adverse selection problem, informational risk and inventory risk (Naranjo & 
Nimalendran 2000; Pasquariello 2006 & Chari 2007).  
  
Looking at the range in the variable DELAVG, we divide it into buckets, arriving at the categorical 
dependent variable (CAVG) with values 1, 2, and 3 for three main volatility ranges. The range of 
variable DELAVG is 0-0.6 but we identify from the frequency distribution, three main buckets for 
the volatility variable2. These are less than 0.05, 0.05 to 0.1 and more than 0.1: taking other buckets 
with smaller ranges would dilute the main aim of classifying low, medium and high volatility 
ranges. The frequency distribution of DELAVG (continuous) and the categorical variable (CAVG) 
is presented in Table 1.  
The exchange rate data as well as intervention and other news data for the study is availed from 
Thomson Reuters Eikon database3, which gives time stamped tick-by-tick bid-ask exchange rate 
data and news reports. The exchange rate data is collected at 5 minute level and averaged for six 
period to get the half-hourly dataset that corresponds to the news data. The news reports feature in 
the Economic Monitor of the Eikon database. The news reports cover the following categories: 
external sector, inflation, Government, labor, growth and central banking. The time-stamped news 
data is collated with the exchange rate date.   
The data on news from all the categories is compiled together date wise and mapped to the 
exchange rate data. A key problem is mapping the news data is news releases in US market 
typically happens in non-market hours for rupee. In this case, we have to map the news on rupee 
to the next immediate exchange rate data available as the market opens. For example, the news at 
Indian time 11 pm (US market hours) is in non-market hours and mapped to the exchange rate data 
at 9 am on opening.  The logic behind this is that the news in the aftermarket hours impacts the 
exchange rate movement immediately as the market opens the next day. Table 2 shows the 
representative news data. For example, on 24 Aug 2017, (19.30 pm: Indian local time) indicator 
Existing Home Sales ' is declared, with polled and actual values. 
One of the core problems to be addressed in analyzing the impact of news on volatility is the issue 
of endogeneity. As the volatility in exchange rate movement in turn impacts economic policy 
decisions (especially intervention by central banks), as reflected in news, the cotemporaneous 
determination of volatility and news cannot be ruled out. Here the use of high frequency data in 
                                                          
2 We recognize the loss of information from the conversion of continuous to discreet (categorical) variable 
but the differentiation into high medium and low volatility buckets is crucial for the Logit analysis used in 
the paper. To keep the information loss as minimal we increase the number of categories (three) (Pasta, 
2009).   
3  Thomson Reuters.   
  
the intra-day frame helps us to address the endogeneity issue. The use of intraday data can address 
the endogeneity issue as the time taken for central bank intervention in response to an increase in 
volatility is likely to be less than the intraday frame under study (Neely, 2005, Chari, 2007).  Chari 
(Ibid) points out this would be especially true for high-frequency data as volatility at high 
frequency level is unlikely to impact intervention in the same time frame. This study using high-
frequency data assumes that the central bank takes at least five minutes to react to the volatility 
and intervene, ruling out the contemporaneous determination of volatility and exchange rate.  
Section4: Empirical model  
Modelling exchange rate volatility in a microstructure framework, we assume that there are 
expected and unexpected components of the news, which impacts exchange rate movement in 
different ways. The difference between actual macroeconomic variable values and the forecasted 
(poll) values representing the market expectation of the macroeconomic variable represents the 
unexpected component of news. The expected and unexpected (surprise) element of the news is 
analyzed separately to see its impact on volatility. Following standard literature (Vortelinos, 2015; 
Omrane and Hafner, 2011), we define the variable representing unexpected news component as 
difference between the expected (poll) and actual (realized) macroeconomic variable values. The 
standard methodology followed to address the problem of difference in units of measurement is to 
divide the news surprise by standard deviation of differences to get the standardized variable Sca,t, 
representing unexpected (surprise) component of news of indicator category ca at time t.   
𝑆𝑐𝑎,𝑡 =  
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑎,𝑡−  𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑎,𝑡
𝜎𝑐𝑎,𝑡
; 
Where  
Actual ca,t = Actual / Realized value of the macroeconomic variable from category (ca) at time t 
Expected ca,t= Poll value of the macroeconomic variable from category (ca) at time t; 
σca,t= Standard deviation of differences between Actual and expected values for category ca. The 
expected news component is calculated separately with reference to the difference between actual 
and unexpected as a ratio of the actual macroeconomic value.  
To incorporate the trader's perceptions regarding the past exchange rate movement relative to the 
news (expected and unexpected components) in the past, we introduce two new variables, Bias 1 
and Bias 2. In each time period, we can think of the trader being biased by the response of exchange 
rate to news in the immediate past, so that if in the previous period markets have demonstrated 
  
volatility in response to a news, the trader will expect a similar movement. Bias 1 & 2, at time t, 
represents the interaction of unexpected and expected news, of time t-1, with returns in time t, 
given by Log (Rt/ Rt-1). The variables therefore underline the perceptions created in the minds of 
the traders by movement of the exchange rate in response of the previous news and its unexpected 
and expected components. Technical analysis is represented by the difference between the price at 
period t, Pt and the 10-period moving average of the price, a commonly used indicator by chartists 
(Murphy, 1999).  
A. Ordered Logit Model: 
The ordered Logit model estimates the relation between an ordered and categorical dependent 
variable (difference in bid ask spreads, CAVG) and a set of independent variable as given in 
equation 3.   
CAVGi= F (BIAS, NEWSi)…………………(3) 
Which can be written as: 
𝐶𝐴𝑉𝐺𝑖 = 𝑏1𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐸𝐷𝑖 + 𝑏2𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐸𝐷𝑖+𝑏3𝐵𝐼𝐴𝑆1𝑖+𝑏4𝐵𝐼𝐴𝑆2𝑖+𝑏5𝑇𝐴𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
The dependent variable in our model is CAVG, which is categorized into 1,2, or 3 according to 
the range, the frequency distribution of which is given in table 1 The ordered categories are now 
estimated as a linear function of independent variables. The dependent variables in this model are 
unexpected and expected news component (Unexpected and Expected respectively), Biases (1 & 
2), reflecting the interaction of exchange rate movement with the expected and unexpected 
components respectively and technical analysis indicator operationalized by difference between 
price and ten-period moving average (TA). The bias variable thus represents the returns with 
reference to past surprises and news expectations.   
The ordered Logit model looks at the determinants of volatility being in different categories. It is 
suitable given the non-normal frequency distribution of CATV and the variable DELAVG 
(histograms in Graph 1 & 2).  As seen from Table 3, the model is statistically significant at 5% 
level of significance and shows that both unexpected and expected news components have 
statistically significant impact on the volatility as proxied by the bid-ask spread over time. 
Importantly, we find there is a statistically significant, positive and large impact of Bias 1 
(reflecting the perception of the traders created by past exchange rate movement in response to 
unexpected market shocks). However, the present period unexpected shock do not lead to an 
increase in volatility, suggesting that the past movement influences trader's perceptions more than 
  
the immediate shock in news. The expected components of news leads to a slight increase in 
volatility, as trader's respond to news itself.  The other variables do not have any statistically 
significant impact on volatility.    
As we can see from the Tables, marginal effects show that Bias 1 reduces greatly the probability 
of volatility being in the lower ranges and the probability of volatility being in the middle and 
upper ranges. Similarly, unexpected component increases the probability of volatility being in the 
lower range and reduces the probability of volatility being in the middle or high range.  
The marginal effects confirm that the expected news also increases the chance of volatility being 
in higher ranges. 
B. GARCH estimation  
We analyze the impact of news and participant perceptions on exchange rate volatility for the data 
using a GRACH framework. In this case, we look at the exchange rate returns and probe the change 
in exchange rate with time and the factors which impact them. For the GARCH model, the data 
test the null hypothesis that intervention has no effect on exchange rate volatility. The basic 
regression model with GARCH (1, 1) errors is 
tttttt
BIASBIASTAEXPECTEDUNEXPECTEDR   251413210     …………. (5) 
),0(~1 ttt hNI                                                        …. (6) 
1
2
1251413210   ttttttt hBIASBIASTAEXPECTEDUNEXPECTEDh 
………….. (7) 
Where, 
LUSDINR= Log returns of average of bid and ask rate  
UNEXECTED=Unexpected component of the news 
EXPECTED=Expected component of news 
EXT=Surprise element of news 
BIAS1= Interaction term of unexpected component of news with exchange rate returns 
BIAS2= Interaction term of expected component of news with exchange rate returns 
TA= Difference between price and ten-period moving average Equation (5) measures the effect of 
news and bias on exchange rate changes; equation (6) states that regression residuals will be 
modeled as a GARCH process; and equation (7) describes the conditional variance. Returns and 
other variables subject to unit root tests [Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF)]. Before running the 
  
GARCH model, the appropriateness of using GARCH is tested by regressing log returns on the 
set of independent variables and testing for ARCH effects, rejecting the null hypothesis of no 
ARCH effects at 5 % level of significance (Table 4 a), as also confirmed by Graph 3 showing 
standardized residuals. Table 4 (b) reports the coefficients of the conditional mean and conditional 
variance equations for the GARCH model, for the model.  
The conditional mean equation shows that both expected and unexpected news, as well as the 
increased gap between moving average and price leads to a small depreciation in the USD/INR 
market.  The GARCH analysis confirms our finding from the Logit. We see that Bias 1 has a large 
and statistically significant positive impact on volatility. Expected news also contributes to 
increased volatility but unexpected news leads to a small reduction in volatility. TA and Bias 2 
(representing perceptions of market participants out of the market movement in response to 
expected news) do not have any statistically significant impact on volatility.  
Section5: Discussions and Conclusion   
The study looks at the contribution of news and traders biases on exchange rate volatility. Out 
paper contributes to the growing empirical evidence of the link between macroeconomic news and 
volatility in financial markets, including foreign exchange markets (Bessembinder, 1994; Fleming 
and Remolona, 1999; Hartmann, 1999; Galati, 2000; Evans and Lyons, 2005, 2008; Omrane & 
Hafner, 2015 and Vortelinos, 2015).However, it also goes on to question what leads to the 
volatility on the market? While the role of unexpected and expected components of news have 
been explored in economic literature (Omrane & Hafner, 2015 and Vortelinos, 2015), news by 
itself do not contribute to volatility. The unexpected and expected components of news make the 
trader form perceptions of market movement. Incorporating the theory of heuristics (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1974), we underline that the biases created by perceptions means traders are likely to 
refer to the recent past solutions available for the trading decision making. This means that the 
trader refers to the past movement of the market in response of the news (expected and unexpected) 
and forms his trading decision. Expectedly, we find a large significant impact of bias 1, or 
perceptions created by past movements, that have occurred in response to unexpected news, on the 
market volatility.  
The ordered Logit model shows that both unexpected and expected news components have 
statistically significant impact on the volatility. There is a large and statistically significant, 
positive impact of Bias 1 (which gives the perception of the traders created by past exchange rate 
  
movement in response to unexpected market shocks) on market heterogeneity. The marginal 
analysis in the Logit framework confirm our findings showing probability of volatility being in 
upper ranges increases with increase in Bias 1 but falls with increase in unexpected component of 
market news.  
The GARCH analysis also extends strong support to our findings from the Logit. Bias 1 has a large 
and statistically significant positive impact on volatility as also, Expected component of news. 
Unexpected news leads to a small reduction in volatility. TA and Bias 2 (representing perceptions 
of market participants out of the market movement in response to expected news) do not have any 
statistically significant impact on volatility. This showcases an interesting aspect of market 
behaviour. As the news comes in, the unexpected and expected components in news influence the 
market heterogeneity, but in immediately following periods, the traders are much influenced by 
the movement that happened in the market in response to unexpected shocks. 
Our paper extends the understanding of why news leads to an increase in volatility for the foreign 
exchange markets. Market participants are closely influenced by past market movements in 
framing their trading decisions. While a new information set is available in any time frame, it is 
difficult to not refer to what has happened in the past while trading. More precisely how the 
markets have reacted earlier on response of a market shock (unexpected component of news) is 
very important in guiding the market participant.  
Empirical literature shows that market heterogeneity comes from the use of different and different 
interpretations of fundamental and technical indicators (Dreger & Stadtmann 2008; Chari 2007),  
While the same set of factors should move the market in a similar fashion, it does not happen so.A 
likely reason, according to this paper, is the availability bias where people assess the "probability 
of an event by the ease with which instances or occurrences can be brought to mind". This means 
that every time as a new set of information and news comes, the market participant does not take 
the trading decision with reference to the new information only. In the decision-making process 
therefore, past likely scenarios (" available" to the trader instantaneously) dominate. The 
forecasting of market movement now comes from the possible set of past experiences or available 
solutions, especially the experience of how the markets have moved earlier in response to a market 
shock. The perception formed by market participants on the basis on how the markets in the pasts 
have reacted to unexpected news shock, contribute majorly to market volatility.  
Tables and Graphs 
  
Table 1: Frequency distribution of CAVG 
Bin Frequency Percentage  
% 
Cumulative 
% 
1 905 83.41 83.41 
2 140 12.90 96.31 
3 40 3.69 100.00 
1 905 83.41 83.41 
Source: Author's calculations 
 
Table 2: Sample news from Eikon database 
 
RIC Local Start 
Date 
Local 
Time 
Country Indicator Name Reuters 
Poll 
Actual 
USEHS=ECI 24 Aug 2017 19:30 United States Existing Home Sales 5.57M 5.42M 
USEHSP=ECI 24 Aug 2017 19:30 United States Exist. Home Sales % 
Chg 
0.9% -1.5% 
USDGN=ECI 25 Aug 2017 18:00 United States Durable Goods -6.0% -6.8% 
USDGXT=ECI 25 Aug 2017 18:00 United States Durables Ex-
Transport 
0.4% 0.5% 
USNDXA=ECI 25 Aug 2017 18:00 United States Nondefe Cap Ex-Air 0.3% 0.4% 
Source: Thomson Reuters Eikon database 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Results of Ordered logistic regression  
Number of obs = 1073 
LR chi2(4) = 15.07 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0101 
Log likelihood = -557.58639 
Pseudo R2 = 0.0315 
VARIABLES COEF. STD. ERR. Z P>|Z| 
TA 0.854 1.225 0.700 0.486 
BIAS2 569.934 432.946 1.320 0.188 
BIAS1 697.172 267.398 2.610 0.009* 
  
UNEXPECTED -0.585 0.311 -1.880 0.060*** 
EXPECTED 0.458 0.172 2.660 0.008* 
/CUT1 1.674 0.090 1.497 1.850 
/CUT2 3.466 0.184 3.106 3.826 
    
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10 per cent levels respectively  
 
MARGINAL EFFECTS AFTER OLOGIT 
  
Y= PR(CAVG=1) (PREDICT, OUTCOME(1)) 
 = 0.83847249 
VARIABLE DY/DX STD. 
ERR 
Z P>|Z| 
TA -0.1156796 0.16523 -0.7 0.484 
BIAS2 -77.18983 58.048 -1.33 0.184 
BIAS1 -94.42239 35.811 -2.64 0.008* 
UNEXPECTED 0.0791734 0.04145 1.91 0.056*** 
EXPECTED -0.0620179 0.02301 -2.7 0.007* 
 
Y= PR(CAVG=2) (PREDICT, OUTCOME(2)) 
 = 0.13043972 
VARIABLE DY/DX STD. 
ERR 
Z P>|Z| 
TA 0.090 0.129 0.700 0.486 
BIAS2 60.023 45.902 1.310 0.191 
BIAS1 73.423 28.477 2.580 0.010** 
UNEXPECTED -0.062 0.032 -1.900 0.058*** 
EXPECTED 0.048 0.018 2.630 0.009* 
 
Y= PR(CAVG=3) (PREDICT, OUTCOME(3)) 
 = 0.03108778 
VARIABLE DY/DX STD. 
ERR 
Z P>|Z| 
TA 0.026 0.036 0.710 0.480 
BIAS2 17.167 12.466 1.380 0.168 
BIAS1 21.000 8.135 2.580 0.010** 
UNEXPECTED -0.018 0.010 -1.850 0.064*** 
EXPECTED 0.014 0.005 2.660 0.008* 
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10 per cent levels 
respectively 
Table 4: Results of the GARCH estimation 
 Unit root test 
  
Variable Test statistic 
value 
 1% critical value  5% critical value  10% critical 
value 
Log (Exchange rate) 0.334 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 
UNEXPECTED -128.164 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 
EXPECTED -1271.447 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 
EXT -38.262 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 
BIAS 1 -55.913 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 
BIAS 2 -8.474 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 
BIAS 3 0.334 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 
 H0: no ARCH effects vs. H1:ARCH(p) 
LM test for autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) 
 lags(p) chi2 df Prob > chi2 
Event 1 1 3.413 1 0.0647*** 
 H0: no ARCH effects vs. H1:ARCH(p) 
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10 per cent levels respectively 
 
Table 2 (b): Results of GARCH estimation   
 Coef. Std. Error z P>z 
UNEXPECTED 0.0001 0.000 1.990 0.046 **  
EXPECTED 0.000 0.000 0.800 0.423   
BIAS 1 -0.014 0.215 -0.070 0.947   
BIAS 2 0.029 0.152 0.190 0.848  
TA 0.004 0.000 9.310 0.000 *  
_cons 0.000 0.000 -0.520 0.600   
HET      
UNEXPECTED -0.545 0.205 -2.660 0.008 * 
EXPECTED 0.305 0.119 2.580 0.010 ** 
BIAS 1 538.504 122.451 4.400 0.000 * 
BIAS 2 470.694 628.301 0.750 0.454  
TA 0.995 5.733 0.170 0.862  
_cons -16.478 0.757 -21.760 0.000 * 
ARCH L1 0.215 0.065 3.300 0.001 * 
GARCH L1 0.486 0.197 2.460 0.014 * 
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10 per cent levels respectively 
 
Graph1: Histogram CATV                                                  Graph 2: Histogram DELAVG                                                   
  
                      
 
Graph 3: Post estimation: ARCH effects 
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